Security systems for multicast data transfer over satellite by Howarth, Michael et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COST Action 272 
“Packet-Oriented Service Delivery via Satellite” 
 
Security systems for multicast data transfer over satellite 
TD-02-024-P 
 
Michael P. Howarth, Sunil Iyengar, Haitham Cruickshank, Zhili Sun 
Centre for Communication Systems Research 
University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Security is an important concern in today’s information age, and particularly so in satellite systems 
where eavesdropping can be easily performed.  This paper describes two examples of end-to-end 
security systems that have been developed within the EU 5th Framework GEOCAST project.  The 
first, SAT-RMTP, provides secure multicast file transfer using a file transfer protocol that is 
optimised for satellite environments.  The second example is optimised for secure multicast data 
streaming: this involves the integration of GSAKMP, a key management protocol, with LKH, a key 
management technique that is scalable to the large number of receivers that are expected in satellite 
multicast. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Satellite-based broadband IP networks have the potential to deliver multicast services cost-effectively.  
However, satellites present some significant security challenges: 
• Eavesdropping and active intrusion are much easier than in terrestrial fixed or mobile 
networks because of the broadcast nature of satellites; 
• Satellite systems are resource-constrained, particularly in the areas of limited transmission 
power (and thus channel capacity), and limited processing and switching capability for 
satellites with on-board processing; 
• Satellite channels experience high bit error rates, which can result in packet loss and the loss 
of security synchronisation. 
Security systems for satellite data thus have to take account of these limitations, in particular the need 
for confidentiality and the requirement to use satellite resources efficiently.  Geostationary satellites 
also suffer from a long propagation delay, and security systems must therefore add only minimal 
delays to traffic. 
The EU IST GEOCAST project is considering the issues associated with multicast over geostationary 
satellite; one of the issues being addressed is end-to-end security of data, and this paper presents two 
examples of end-to-end security systems that have been developed within the project.  These are 
secure multicast file transfer and secure multicast data streaming. 
This paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of the GEOCAST project.  
Section 3 introduces some definitions associated with electronic security.  Section 4 describes the 
secure multicast file transfer protocol, SAT-RMTP.  Section 5 then proceeds to describe two 
technologies that support secure multicast data streaming: these are GSAKMP and LKH. 
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Figure 1: GEOCAST project 
2. The GEOCAST project 
The GEOCAST project, funded within the EU 5th Framework IST programme, is looking at the 
issues associated with multicast over geostationary satellite, and aims to develop a satellite system 
capable of supporting multiple data types (data, video, audio), including multicast applications, on a 
single network technology (Figure 1) [Geoc]. 
One of the areas considered in GEOCAST is security: the objective of this work is to investigate and 
examine issues related to satellite multicast security.  To this end, the security component has focused 
on two areas: 
• Core security: authentication of entities (primarily the user earth stations) to the satellite prior 
to assigning satellite resources (frequency allocation and channel capacity); and data link 
layer encryption of traffic on the satellite uplinks and downlinks to provide privacy. 
• End-to-end security: security, primarily for privacy, provided typically at the network, 
transport or application layer. 
Issues associated with multicast data transfer arise in the end-to-end security, and it is these issues that 
have been explored in the work described in Sections 4 and 5 of this paper. 
3. Electronic security 
Algorithms used in electronic security can be divided into two groups.  The first group is secret key 
algorithms, where the encryption key and the decryption key are the same or can be calculated from 
one another.  The second group is public key algorithms, which consist of two matched keys A and B 
of the same length.  Here, a message encoded with one key A can only be decoded with the other key 
B, and similarly a message encoded with key B can only be decoded with key A.  Security systems 
can be implemented using X.509 digital certificates: these use public key algorithms, and an X.509 
certificate contains the name of the owner and their public key, key A of the public key algorithm.  
The certificate owner maintains key B as a secret at all times and never divulges it to any other entity. 
Electronic security can be divided into four principal services: authentication, confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation, defined as follows: 
• Authentication is a service used to verify the identity of entities involved in a communication.  
This is generally achieved by the entities sharing a secret (for example a PIN number stored 
in hardware) or by a digital certificate.  
• Confidentiality ensures that only the intended parties have access to communications between 
two or more entities.  This is generally achieved by encryption of communications traffic 
using a private key known only to the communicating entities.  The private key could be 
either the shared secret described above (e.g. the PIN number), or one created between two 
entities using e.g. the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. A weaker form of confidentiality may be 
achieved by restricting the routing of traffic across a network, although this is not applicable 
to satellite-based communication. 
• Integrity guarantees that information sent from one party to another is not changed en route 
(either accidentally or maliciously), and that if such changes have occurred then they can be 
identified.  One way of achieving this is by hashing the information to create a short string 
and then “signing” (=encrypting) the hash with a secret key: this creates a hashed message 
authentication code (HMAC). 
• Non-repudiation is a service that ensures that the originator of a message is unable to deny 
sending the message.  This is achieved by the originator creating a MAC using a secret known 
only to the originator (such as the secret key B corresponding to their digital certificate). 
In general, these security services are provided between entities because of the existence of a secure 
association: that is, they share one or more secret keys known only to the entities, and they have 
agreed on a set of algorithms that will provide the security services. 
4. Secure multicast file transfer: SAT-RMTP 
Satellite Reliable Multicast Transfer Protocol (SAT-RMTP) provides secure multicast transfer of files 
such as multimedia clips and bulk data transfers (databases etc), Figure 2 [Koya,02].  An application 
tool has been implemented that consists of three modules (Figure 3): 
• Session module; 
• SAT-RMTP module; 
• Security module. 
The first two modules were developed at the University of Aberdeen, and the security module was 
developed at the University of Surrey. 
The session module announces services (file transfers) being offered, and co-ordinates the 
transmission and scheduling of these file transfers.  The session server periodically transmits session 
announcements to listening receivers.  These announcements include session start and end time, 
media type and other session related parameters.  Based on this information, receivers either join or 
ignore each advertised session. 
The SAT-RMTP module provides reliable transmission of encrypted data between the source 
(transmitter) and those receivers that have registered for a particular file transfer. 
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Figure 2: SAT-RMTP overview 
The security module implements the following security features: 
• Authentication of users (clients) – using a public key algorithm and X.509 digital certificates; 
• User access control for each multimedia file; 
• Key exchange using public key algorithm; 
• Confidentiality, based on file encryption using a secret key algorithm; 
• Integrity of the whole file using HMACs; 
• Detection of replay attacks using random numbers.  
The security module works as follows.  Prior to the file transfer, the module generates a secret key 
and encrypts the entire file using this key.  After transfer of the encrypted file (using the SAT-RMTP 
protocol) each security client requests the key from the security server.  The security server 
authenticates each client using the X.509 digital certificate sent by the client, and then checks the 
access permissions of the client (user access control).  If the client has the correct permissions, the 
security server unicasts the key (encrypted with the security client’s public key, contained in their 
certificate) to the authorised client.  The client can then decrypt the file, and check its integrity using 
the HMAC. 
The entire system has been implemented in C and Linux, and demonstrated running over a satellite 
emulator. 
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Figure 3: SAT-RMTP application tool architecture 
5. Secure data streaming: GSAKMP and LKH 
The process of securing a unicast connection is well understood [Maug,98], [Hark,98], [Orma,98], but 
multicast security is more complex.  In principle, a multicast connection can be regarded as a set of 
unicast connections, but this approach does not scale well for large groups, especially at the scales 
expected in satellite systems.  Protocols that manage the process of distributing keys in a multicast 
environment are under development [Harn,02], [Arrk,02], [Baug,02]. 
The principal actors in multicast key management are the group controller (GC) and group members 
(GMs).  The former is responsible for creating and distributing keys and rekeying (to maintain 
security) as appropriate; the group members are entities with access to the group keys.  The GC need 
not be co-located with the multicast data source.  Each group member has an initial one-to-one secure 
association with the group controller (using techniques such as Diffie-Hellman to create a shared 
secret known only to the two parties; or a pre-shared secret; or secret exchange using a public key 
system [Schn,96]).  These one-to-one secure associations are then used to create and share 
information about a group secure association between the group controller and the group members.  
The ultimate aim of the group secure association is to ensure that a single key, usually called the 
group traffic encryption key (GTEK), is known to all group controller and group members, and to no 
entity outside the group: this key can then be used to encrypt the data multicast within the group.  We 
now discuss one of the key distribution protocols currently under development within the IETF, 
GSAKMP Light. 
5.1. GSAKMP Light 
The lightweight Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol [Harn,02] is a scaled-down 
version of the original IETF work, GSAKMP.  The lightweight version assumes that group members 
(GMs) have been previously notified of the security mechanisms (i.e. the algorithms used for 
authentication, encryption, integrity and non-repudiation) used in the group during the group 
announcement or invitation.  GSAKMP Light provides mechanisms to perform the following key 
management tasks: 
• Disseminate group policy; 
• Distribute group keys; 
• Rekey the group (e.g. if a member is compromised). 
The life cycle of a GSAKMP group secure association can be divided into three phases, and these are 
now briefly discussed.  The discussion is illustrated with the message flows shown in Figure 4; the 
left side of the diagram represents the actions of the GC, and the right side of the diagram represents 
the actions of the GMs. 
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Figure 4: GSAKMP Light message exchange 
GSAKMP group establishment  
Potential GMs may join a group in one of two ways:   
• Invitation (push); 
• Request (pull).   
Figure 4 illustrates a Request to Join Group (RTJ), a “pull” message sent from a potential GM.  On 
receiving the RTJ, the GC must either accept or deny the request.  If accepted the GC checks the RTJ 
message and following successful authorisation and verification creates the key download payload.  
This includes the policy token payload, the traffic encryption key payload and also the rekey event 
payload which helps in scalable group maintenance.  The GM returns an acknowledgement to the GC 
on successful receipt of the key download message. 
GSAKMP group maintenance 
The Group Maintenance phase includes: 
• Member joins and leaves: a group member that elects to voluntarily leave the group is 
responsible for destroying their own key(s).  Any further action for a voluntary leave must be 
specifically addressed in the group's security policy; 
• Group rekey activities: the GC creates and sends a new group key and a rekey array (such as 
a hierarchy of keys from LKH, see Section 5.3) as illustrated in Figure 4.  Subject to 
authentication, GMs then use these keys for successive decrypting.  The reasons for rekeying 
are discussed further in Section 5.2. 
GSAKMP group removal / destruction 
The final phase in the group’s life cycle is group removal.  If a decision is made to destroy the group, 
the notification may either be broadcast on a key management channel (as shown in Figure 4) or 
through a directory service. 
5.2. Group rekeying 
The multicast group may need to be rekeyed for any of a number of reasons: 
(1) The group key is usually updated regularly (typically every few seconds or minutes) to reduce the 
probability of successful cryptanalysis of the encrypted traffic. 
(2) The group key may also need to be changed on demand if it is determined that the key has been 
compromised. 
(3) Rekeying may be required when a new user joins the multicast group.  This ensures that the user 
cannot decrypt encoded traffic that was sent prior to their joining (this is called backward 
secrecy). 
(4) Rekeying may be required when an existing user departs from the multicast group.  This ensures 
that the user cannot decrypt encoded traffic that is sent after they leave (this is called forward 
secrecy). 
For large multicast groups that have frequent membership changes the cost of rekeying can be 
significant, since satellite resources are expensive.  Scalable rekeying is therefore an important 
problem that needs to be considered in order to support secure communications for large dynamic 
groups.  We now proceed to investigate rekey techniques for each of the four functions listed above. 
Several techniques exist for rekeying (1) and (3) above: two options are for the new group key to be 
encrypted with either (a) the old group key, or (b) a separate “control” key negotiated during session 
establishment.  For (2) and (4) above a different rekeying approach is required since the old key is 
known by at least one user who is no longer to be a recipient of the multicast transmission.  We now 
consider options for this rekeying, focusing in particular on one mechanism, LKH. 
5.3. Logical key hierarchy (LKH) 
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [Wong,00], [RFC2627], described in more detail below, uses a set of 
keys arranged in a tree structure to reduce the cost of rekeying.  For a tree of outdegree k, the number 
of rekeys transmitted on a member compromise is reduced from dkN =  (for a flat system) to 
1log −Nk k .  
Improvements to LKH for the specific case of binary trees (k=2) have also been proposed in one-way 
function trees [Bale,99] [Moye,99], and by [Cane,99]: both these approaches reduce the number of 
rekeys required in the event of compromise of a user from 1log2 2 −N  to N2log .  Here we focus on 
the basic mechanism, which is receiving wide support in the research community.  We now briefly 
review the working of LKH, repeating material from [Anno,02]. 
We initially consider the simple flat key management system.  Consider N pairwise keys each shared 
between the group controller and one of the N group members (Figure 5a): this represents the flat 
system described in Section 2.  The pairwise key associations are represented by the circles and the 
group key is represented by the box labelled ‘A’.  If the group key is changed the new group key has 
to be encrypted with each user’s unique pairwise key and then unicast to that user; each of these 
encrypted keys is represented by one of the lines drawn in Figure 5a.  Thus for N users a total of N 
encrypted keys are generated and transmitted across the satellite network.   
We contrast this with LKH, where a tree of keys is used: in Figure 5b the keys are labelled A through 
O, the circles again represent the pairwise keys, and the lines each represent encrypted keys sent 
across the network, as we shall now see.  Suppose that User 11 needs to be deleted from the multicast 
group.  Then all of the keys held by User 11 (keys F, K, N, O) must be changed and distributed to the 
users who need them, without permitting User 11 to obtain them or anyone else who is not entitled to 
them.  To do this, we must replace the keys held by User 11, proceeding from the bottom up. 
The server chooses a new key for the lowest node (not the leaf, for which a unicast secure association 
exists between the GC and the GM), and then transmits it encrypted with the appropriate daughter 
keys.  Thus for this example, the first key replaced is Key F, and this new key will be sent encrypted 
with User 12’s unique pairwise key.  The second key replaced is Key K, which is sent encrypted with 
the newly replaced Key F (for User 12) and also sent encrypted with key E (for Users 9 and 10).  Key 
N is then sent encrypted in the newly replaced Key K (for Users 9, 10, and 12) and also encrypted in 
key L (shared by Users 13 through 16).  Finally, Key O is replaced, and this new key is sent encrypted 
in the newly replaced Key N (for Users 9, 10, and 12 through 16) and also separately is encrypted in 
key M (shared by Users 1 to 8).  Since we are proceeding from the bottom up, each of the replacement 
keys will have been replaced before it is used to encrypt another key.  
The seven keys sent represent a significant saving on the 16 keys that would need to be transmitted 
using the flat key system of Figure 5a.  In general, the number of transmissions required is the sum of 
the degrees of the replaced nodes. In a k-ary tree of depth d, this is a total of 1log1 −=− Nkkd k  
transmissions. 
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Figure 5: Key hierarchies: (a) N pairwise keys (left); (b) logical key hierarchy (right) 
The GTEK, used to encrypt data traffic, may, depending on the group security policy, either be key O 
(Figure 5b), or it may be separately encrypted using key O and transmitted to all group members. 
The system is robust against collusion, in that no set of users together can read any message unless 
one of them could have read it individually.  Alternatively, multiple keys can be sent in one message, 
provided that there exists a means for each user to determine which key in the message corresponds to 
which node of the hierarchy (for example, [Harn,02]).  Taking into account the per-message 
overheads, a single multicast message uses the fewest bits to transmit the new keys. 
5.4. GSAKMP and LKH integration 
LKH is currently supported as the default rekey mechanism in GSAKMP.  Support for other rekey 
mechanisms (such as one-way function trees, [Bale,99],[Moye,99]) will be included in the future 
versions of GSAKMP.  We have implemented GSAKMP and LKH in C and Linux, and have 
successfully demonstrated key transfer between a group controller and multiple group members. 
6. Summary 
In this paper we have described two examples of end-to-end security systems.  The first, SAT-RMTP, 
provides secure multicast file transfer using a file transfer protocol that is optimised for satellite 
environments.  The second example is optimised for secure multicast data streaming: this involves the 
integration of GSAKMP, a key management protocol, with LKH, a key management technique that is 
scalable to the large number of receivers that are expected in satellite multicast.  GSAKMP / LKH 
integration and interworking has been demonstrated in a laboratory set-up: this technology can be 
used at application level, transport level or network level. 
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